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Abstract 
 
 
The ongoing refugee crisis has divided the European Union. While some states shelter 
hundreds of thousands of refugees, others only grant asylum to a handful. This phenomenon is 
creating a demographic rift inside the union and is also causing internal quarrels over joint 
responsibility, which possibly could undermine the existence of the organization. In this thesis 
we search for the potential causes of the intra-organizational discrepancy by examining 
Sweden and Finland. These two states have approximately the same prerequisites for granting 
asylums, but vary greatly in number. In order to determine what causes this incongruity the 
states will be analyzed with two variables. The first variable examines the major political 
parties’ refugee policy, through framing theory. The second variable analyses the Migration 
Boards through Max Weber’s bureaucracy theory and scrutinizes the Director Generals of 
these organizations. Both variables result in sub-conclusions, which in the end are merged 
into one. The final conclusion determines that both variables are jointly contributing to the 
Swedish-Finnish discrepancy with the states having different political foundational frames, 
varying levels of bureaucracy of the Migration Boards and different approaches towards 
immigration from the Director Generals of the Migration Boards. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Residence permits, asylum, Sweden, Finland, Swedish Migration Agency, Finnish 
Immigration Service, political parties, framing theory, bureaucracy theory.  
 
Word count: 7484 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table of contents 
 
1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Limitations ......................................................................................................................................2 
    1.2 Previous research ............................................................................................................................2 
2. Theoretical framework ........................................................................................................ 3 
2.1 Framing theory ...............................................................................................................................3 
2.1.1 First independent variable .......................................................................................................4 
2.2 Bureaucracy theory .........................................................................................................................5 
2.2.1 Second independent variable ...................................................................................................7 
3. Method and research design ................................................................................................ 8 
4. Analysis ............................................................................................................................... 10 
  4.1 Analysis of first variable  ...........................................................................................................10 
    4.1.1 The refugee policy of political parties in Sweden and Finland .........................................10 
     4.1.1.1 Analysis of the refugee policy of the Swedish parties ..................................................10 
4.1.1.1.1 The Moderate Party ........................................................................................................................ 11 
4.1.1.1.2 The Centre Party ............................................................................................................................. 12 
4.1.1.1.3 The Social Democratic Party .......................................................................................................... 12 
4.1.1.1.4 The Green Party ............................................................................................................................. 13 
4.1.1.1.5 The Sweden Democrats .................................................................................................................. 13 
     4.1.1.2 Analysis of the refugee policy of the Finnish parties  ...................................................14 
4.1.1.2.1 The Social Democratic Party of Finland ........................................................................................ 14 
4.1.1.2.2 The National Coalition Party .......................................................................................................... 14 
4.1.1.2.3 The Centre Party of Finland ........................................................................................................... 15 
4.1.1.2.4 The Finns Party .............................................................................................................................. 15 
4.1.1.2.5 The Left Alliance ........................................................................................................................... 16 
     4.1.1.3 Conclusion of the first variable  .............................................................................. 17 
  4.2 Analysis of the second variable ........................................................................................ 19 
    4.2.1 Examination of the levels of bureaucracy in the SMA and the FIS ..........................................19 
        4.2.1.1 Prevalence of Weber’s first characteristic in the Migration Boards ................................................... 19 
         4.2.1.2 Prevalence of Weber’s second characteristic in the Migration Boards .............................................. 19 
        4.2.1.3 Prevalence of Weber’s third characteristic in the Migration Boards .................................................. 20 
        4.2.1.4 Prevalence of Weber’s fourth characteristic in the Migration Boards ................................................ 21 
        4.2.1.5 Prevalence of Weber’s fifth characteristic in the Migration Boards .................................................. 21 
        4.2.1.6 Prevalence of Weber’s sixth characteristic in the Migration Boards .................................................. 21 
    4.2.2 Conclusion of the first section of the second variable ..............................................................22 
    4.2.3 Examination of the Director Generals of the Migration Boards between 2010-2015 ...............23 
       4.2.3.1 Jorma Vuorio ..................................................................................................................................... 23 
        4.2.3.2 Jaana Vuorio....................................................................................................................................... 23 
        4.2.3.3 Dan Eliasson....................................................................................................................................... 23 
        4.2.3.4 Anders Danielsson ............................................................................................................................. 24 
    4.2.4 Conclusion of the second variable .............................................................................................24 
5. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 25 
5.1 Concluding remarks ......................................................................................................................26 
References ............................................................................................................................... 27 
Appendixes .............................................................................................................................. 35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
One of the biggest consequences of war and conflicts is refugee crises. In Europe this 
phenomenon is the most evident result of the conflicts in the Middle East and Africa. Even 
though the great majority of European states are members of The European Union (EU) the 
approach and management regarding refugees is very diverse throughout the union. Some 
countries, such as Sweden and Germany, grant a high number of refugees' residence while 
other states such as Finland and Estonia do the opposite. This phenomenon is causing demographic 
discrepancy in the union as well as leading to quarrels over responsibility. In the long run this 
could undermine the organization, leading to the dissolution of the European Union. Without doubt 
there are internal differences on state basis in the EU when it comes to economic factors, which 
partly could explain this diversity. However some states have very similar capabilities and 
possibilities to handle refugees, but still the numbers of residence permits distributed to asylum 
seekers1 vary greatly between them. This phenomenon raises the interesting questions of why this 
is the case and examining this puzzle will be the striving of this thesis. Sweden and Finland are 
two EU-countries that are similar in a number of ways2 but when it comes to granting asylums the 
countries differentiate completely. In 2014 Sweden distributed 23 times as many residence permits 
to asylum seekers than Finland.3 
 
The gap between the countries creates a perfect ground for a comparative case study that 
hopefully can unravel the core to the question of why the diversity between the states exists. 
The large difference in residence permits between two states similar to a high extent such as 
Sweden and Finland raises the question of the origins of this diversity. The importance of the 
question is furthermore emphasized by the fact that the refugee crisis Europe is facing will 
shape the union significantly. The radically different number of RPDAS per capita 
for each state will change the demographic scattering of the union as whole. Since the 
situation is ongoing, and probably will continue for a foreseeable future, it is of utmost 
importance that the mechanisms behind the diversity are being unraveled. We mean that a 
clear result originating from the difference of two states similar to the degree of Sweden and 
Finland will be applicable on most other cases, in line with John Stuart Mill’s method of 
difference.4 Thus the number of states being examined in this thesis is sufficient in order to 
fulfil the purpose of finding what regulates whether a state decides to grant a high or low 
number of asylums. The research question reads as follows: 
What explains the difference in residence permits distributed to asylum seekers in Sweden and 
Finland between the years 2010 - 2015? 
                                                 
1 The term residence permits distributed to asylum seekers is used frequently in this study and will be shortened to 
RPDAS. 
2 For a further discussion on this matter see chapter Method and research design p. 3 
3  Swedish Migration Agency, 2015a; Finnish Immigration Service, 2015a; For a visual comparison of the discrepancy 
of the state’s RPDAS see Table 2 p. 18 
4 Teorell & Svensson, 2007:221–222; Esaiasson et al, 2012:115–119 
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1.1 Limitations 
 
Our study will focus on analyzing the years between 2010 and 2015, since these years have 
been the most intense from a RPDAS perspective in modern time. This does not 
mean that we are excluding the possibility of earlier events having major implications for the 
course of actions, but rather that we believe the last years to have a larger significance for the 
study in general. Furthermore this is a period where both countries have had elections, where 
the economic development between the countries is similar but where the statistics of 
RPDAS differs a lot which in total makes it a suitable limitation.5 Although statistics are used to 
some degree, this thesis foundations are limited to qualitative methods because of the limited 
space. We will also limit the study to RPDAS in order to exclude temporary students and workers 
etc. Furthermore we will only examine first-time permits, thus removing renewed and extended 
permits from the study. Lastly we will have to limit this study to analyzing the Migration Boards6 
of Sweden and Finland, consequently excluding instances such as The Migration Court and The 
Migration Court of Appeal.7 
1.2 Previous research  
 
The field of study is relatively unexplored, which further increases the relevance of this thesis. 
Some prominent researchers whose ideas we have used for inspirational matters, however, are 
Simon McMahon who studied how European states frame and react to intra-European 
immigration,8 Shakti Srichandan who discussed effects of migrant workers becoming a more 
frequent phenomenon in the EU9 and a Danish research team led by Nikolaj Malchow-Møller that 
quantitatively examined the variations of attitudes towards immigrations in different European 
countries.10 These studies are without doubt related to our but not close enough for us to effectively 
build on them cumulatively, thus making our study something of a pioneer in the field.  
 
 
 
                                                 
5 For a visual comparison of the discrepancy of the state’s RPDAS see Table 2 p. 18 
6 A Migration Board is the general term for an organization that manages applications for asylum. It is the term that 
will be used for discussing the Swedish Migration Agency and the Finnish Immigration Board jointly in this study.  
7 The Migration Court and Migration Court of Appeal are instances that, among other things, reconsider rejected 
asylum applications deeming it possible to be receive residence permission through these authorities as well. 
8 McMahon, 2015 
9 Srichandan, 2015 
10 Malchow-Møller et al, 2008 
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2. Theoretical framework 
2.1 Framing Theory 
The first theory that will be guiding the work of this thesis is Framing Theory. The core idea 
of this theory is that when an individual or a group of actors jointly recognizes a particular 
event, the unit tends to employ one or more frameworks or scheme of interpretation. The 
framework functions to interpret what would otherwise be a meaningless aspect of the scene 
into something that is meaningful. It enables the person to locate, perceive, identify and label 
all possible occurrences defined in its circumstances. The term to describe this is political 
marketing11 which deals with the marketing of political platforms, political candidates and political 
parties. The framing part of this is political leaders trying to build on a particular setting in order 
to endow that context with meaning using his/her store of knowledge. The frame then operates as 
a lens through which the public looks at and examines the situation.12 Hence the leaders set the 
agenda and the reference point for the public. 
There are different types of frames such as thematic, evaluative and threat frames.13 These three 
have been selected out of their relevancy for the thesis and because of being three of the most 
prominent frames in the field.14 
1. The thematic framing introduces a content dimension or an organizing theme to the 
perception, interpretation and assessment of the situation. The frame then operates as a 
prism or lens that illuminates the creator’s specific vision and displays it to the public 
forum, thus producing an environmental context for the particular issue.15 
 
2. The evaluative framing illustrates frames that serve as benchmarks to which the 
external environment is compared. A certain frame can thereby make the public 
perceive the reality brighter or darker than is actually justified by a specific situation or 
event.16 
 
3. If a political leader or party is more direct in their framing they can use threat 
framing. It includes tinting someone or something with a certain degree of fear and 
pointing it out as a threat.17 
                                                 
11 Mintz & DeRouen Jr, 2010:149; Winther Nielsen, 2015:340-343 
12 Mintz & DeRouen Jr, 2010:151–153 
13 Graham et al, 2013:423–427 
14 Minte & DeRouen Jr, 2010:150–153; Mintz & Redd, 2003:195–198 
15 Gross, 2008:171–174; Mintz & DeRouen Jr, 2010:151–152 
16 Mintz & Redd, 2003:195–198 
17 Mintz & De Rouen Jr, 2010:149–154 
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All three includes the overall power of framing carrying the possibility to change the public 
perception of a problem, without even distorting or suppressing information, merely by the 
framing of outcomes and contingencies.18 The political programs of the parliamentary 
represented political parties of Sweden and Finland embody the ideologies, positions and 
substantial questions that they want to shed light on by creating a frame. The stated stand points 
written there reflects the core opinion of the party as whole. Hence the political programs can be 
the source of the framing tactics that the political parties in each country manifest. We hope to 
find what the essence of the party's foundational principles are and also how the different 
arguments are put forward - how they are framed. The analysis can unravel potential relationships 
between Sweden and Finland's different approach to granting asylums. With the discussion above 
in mind the first variable of this study is: 
         2.1.1 First independent variable 
      The standpoint of political parties in the question of RPDAS of both countries represented 
by the political parties in each country's parliament, and manifested by the parties' 
political platforms. Since the political platforms is the foundation of the party's standpoint 
we believe that a distinct trend discovered herein would be crucial for the number of 
granted asylums. The concrete aspect that will be examined is: ”What essential trends can 
we identify regarding the political parties, positive or negative attitude towards 
immigration and how is it manifested?" To emphasize the variable's reliability19 we will 
use two measuring points, 2010 and 2015, in order to determine whether the party has 
been having a similar standpoint for the past five years thus affecting the process for 
RPDAS through their political actions.
                                                 
18 ibid 
19 Esaiasson et al, 2012:57 
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2.2 Bureaucracy Theory 
 
The second theory that we will apply is Max Weber's bureaucracy theory.20 Weber meant 
that an organization21 under optimal conditions, given suitable employees and approving 
environment, eventually would flourish into complete bureaucracy.22 The fundamental state 
of bureaucracy is achieved when the institution goes from being a dependent, replaceable 
and ineffective unit to a state of almost living organism, that works independently – thus 
practically impossible to dissolve. The bureaucracy almost receives a soul of its own and 
can come to alter the power relationship with the hand that once created it, consequently 
achieving a degree of autonomy which was not originally intended. 
 
In order for an institution to achieve the state of Weberian bureaucracy six characteristics 
must be fulfilled: 
 
1. First of all the employees of the bureaucracy must act within a legally regulated mandate, 
which causes employees at the bottom of the hierarchical ladder to have a narrow mandate 
connected to a small area of expertise.23 
 
2. Secondly the hierarchy needs to be solid and its order of conduct not to be questioned. There 
is no such thing as a personal opinion with the exception of the executive leadership.24 The 
leadership can on the other hand form the bureaucracy as they prefer since the organization, 
like a vehicle, is conductible to anyone who has the keys to its engine and know how to 
conduct it.25 
 
3. The hierarchal relationship should be stated in the bureaucracy's internal doctrine, thus 
preventing rapid change of the institutions foundation.26 The bureaucracy should not, 
however, be restrained by a higher authority such as a government or laws to a high extent, 
since it must be internally maneuverable in order to maintain its efficiency.27  
 
4. To further increase the bureaucracy's formality all employees are obligated to have a 
specialized education tilted towards the narrow area he/she will be working in. The 
employee should be connected to the work to such a degree that disobeying or transferring 
between departments should be almost impossible.28 
                                                 
20 Weber, 1991:196-203; Lachmann, 1971:49-56 
21 By organization Weber means a formal unit such as a department or an enterprise, not a family or a  group of 
friends; Dronberger, 1971:296–299 
22 Weiss, 1983:42–47 
23 Weber, 1991:196–199; Dronberger, 1971:293–297 
24 Mintzberg, 1983:9–15 
25 Lachmann, 1971:62–67 
26 Dronberger, 1971:311–314 
27 ibid 
28 Bendix, 1960:294–298 
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5. The position of the employee inside the bureaucracy should be his/her only work,  
resulting in the organization being a significant part of his/her life and minimizing external 
influences that could backfire on the bureaucracy.29 With no input from the employees the 
course of action decided by the executive leadership will sustain without questions or 
objections from the staff making the bureaucratic machinery extremely efficient.30 
 
6. Finally Weber emphasizes the importance of the bureaucracy sharing a common 
vision. Even though the bureaucracy is gradually dehumanizing the staff they 
should still have goals, which of course are defined by the executive leadership.31 
By stating clear and achievable visions the bureaucratic machinery automatically 
works in this direction.32 
 
By fulfilling these six characteristic of bureaucracy Weber claims that any organization 
will be extremely efficient which is being manifested in a famous quote about the perfect 
organization: "Precision, speed, consistency, availability of record, continuity, possibility 
of secrecy, unity, rigorous coordination, and minimization of friction and of expense for 
materials and personnel are achieved in a strictly bureaucratized [...] administration 
conducted by trained officials [...]".33 
 
Both the Swedish Migration Agency and the Finnish Immigration Service fall under the 
Weberian organizational criteria,34 but we have reason to believe that the level of 
bureaucracy is varying between the two institutions. If the discrepancy in terms of 
degrees of bureaucracy would be significant, it would (combined with an executive 
leadership working in a straight direction) affect the outcome of RPDAS in each state, 
since the Migration Office then would be able to choose a path of its own. To clarify this 
statement we would like to return to Weber's second characteristic for the ultimate 
bureaucracy where the leadership could conduct the machinery as they prefer, thus 
enabling a highly efficient bureaucracy to grant and execute a high number of RPDAS. 
The same bureaucracy could also work in the opposite direction and actively prevent 
asylums. One example of an autonomous actions being taken by the Swedish Migration 
Agency is the decision to let every Syrian refugee receive permanent residence permit in 
September 2013.35 The decisions of the leadership of the Swedish and Finnish migration 
office will therefore be studied thoroughly in this thesis. An ineffective organization 
would not be able to grant asylums at the level of a perfect bureaucracy even if provided 
with an asylum benevolent leadership. Therefore it is of utmost importance to also study 
                                                 
29 Weber, 1991:202 
30 Dronberger, 1971:301–304 
31 Bendix, 1960:294–298 
32 Weiss, 1983:244–247; Bendix, 1960:289–293 
33 Weber cited in Dronberger, 1971:303 
34 Weber, 1991:196–203 
35 Swedish Migration Agency, 2015b 
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the level of bureaucracy of the Swedish Migration Agency and the Finnish Migration 
Service from Weber's six characteristics with the following variable: 
 
              2.2.1 Second independent variable 
 
The degree of bureaucracy in the Swedish and Finnish Migration Offices 
measured from Max Weber's six characteristics of bureaucracy. In addition 
this variable will examine the standpoint in terms of distributing residence 
permits to asylum seekers of the executive leadership of the Swedish and Finish 
Migration Boards. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  8 
3. Method and research design 
 
The research question of this thesis emphasizes the causal mechanism that explains why 
Sweden distributed more residence permits to asylum seekers than Finland, during a specific 
period of time. In order to provide an answer adjusted to this fact we focus on said 
explanation, rather than the understanding of the issue.36 To achieve a deeper understanding 
of the phenomenon a more widespread study also including an analysis of discourses and a 
more thorough historical survey would be needed, which is beyond the limits of this study. 
Instead this thesis aims not only to clarify the origins of the diversity of RPDAS in Sweden 
and Finland, but to reveal a general pattern of under which conditions residence permits are 
distributed to asylum seekers. In order to prove such causality we will use the 
methodological framework of Mill called method of difference which claims that if two 
similar units face the same conditions and receive different results, other units will follow 
the same pattern.37 
 
Since Sweden and Finland are located in the same geographic region, share a common 
history to a large extent, are members of the European Union and have equal levels of 
internal EU trading38 they are without doubt to be classified as very similar states, thus Mill's 
method of difference will be applicable. 
 
It is reasonable to believe that the political parties represented in the Swedish and Finnish 
parliament affect the number of RPDAS, just as the same parties decide most matters in the 
two states. This is also the reason to why the first variable about political stand-points is 
included in the study and why the party platforms are used as the foundational source. 
Political platforms, programs and official statements are the main messages communicated 
outwards by the parties and therefore a relevant object to analyze. We are aware of the fact 
that parties not always stick to their political platforms, but in order to maintain a high level 
of electoral support and legitimacy the agenda must be followed to a high extent. A party 
that repeatedly acts contrary to its political platform will act against the voters that elected 
it an eventually lose support and their seats in the parliament. By only examining parties 
being represented in the parliament (with higher emphasis on the five largest of each state) 
we therefore ensure that the political programs are representative for the actions being taken 
by the party, thus making the variable a relevant unit of measurement. A party 
communicating a hostile view towards migration and RPDAS will most likely do its utmost 
to limit this phenomenon and vice versa. 
                                                 
36 Hollis, 1994:18–19 & 248-250 
37 Teorell & Svensson, 2007:225–226; Esaiason et al, 2012:154–157 
38 Eurostat, 2014b 
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The reasoning above leads us towards our second variable - the mandate, capability and the 
will of the executive leadership of the Swedish Migration Agency and The Finnish Migration 
Service. For this variable we will study the two organizations thoroughly in order to 
determine the level of bureaucracy from the Weberian characteristics. We will also examine 
the stand-points of the executive leadership in both Migration Boards in order to determine 
their view on the issue of RPDAS. 
The variables are separated and connected to different theories, but we believe that there is 
a degree of linkage between them. The first variable is directly affecting the second since it 
is reasonable to believe that a state with a political forum flourishing with support for 
migration would allocate a significant portion of the state budget to their Migration Board 
and increase its mandate. Obviously it could work the other way around too, with the 
political parties creating a restraining environment for that Migration Board.  
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4. Analysis 
 
4.1 Analysis of first variable  
 
4.1.1 The refugee policy of political parties in Sweden and 
Finland 
In the following chapter we will foremost examine the most visible and characterizing 
standpoints & approaches towards refugee policy39 in the five largest40 political parties in 
Sweden and Finland. We use the programs and manifests that are available, but also look into 
their websites where they often mention RP as one of their political subjects. The relevant 
standpoints will be connected with framing theory since the particular way a frame is created 
effects how a certain issue can be thought about and accordingly affects the possibilities for 
different actions.41 An analysis that conclude what and how the political parties are framing 
their RP and what effects this has on each state’s national attitude. During the research we 
have observed tendencies in the thematic framing of the RP on state basis. The national 
Swedish thematic frame on the issue is displaying an overall open view and considers 
immigration as an enriching possibility of growth.42  The Finnish national thematic frame 
reveals a more indifferent view with little light being shed on the issue. The actual attention 
given, however, is generally endorsing a restrained and controlled vision.43  
 
4.1.1.1 Analysis of the refugee policies of the Swedish parties 
The five largest political parties according to mandates is the Swedish Social Democratic 
Party (S), Moderate Party (M), Green Party (MP), Centre party (C) and the Sweden 
Democrats (SD) (SCB, 2015)  
                                                 
39 The term refugee policy is used frequently in this study and will be shortened to RP. 
40 By largest we mean the percentage of seats held in the parliament between 2010 and 2015. The decision to 
mainly concentrate the analysis to the larger parties is motivated with the fact that substantial political power is 
needed to significantly affect the outcome of the nation’s migration politics. The smaller parties are not, 
however, excluded from the study. For further information and discussion of them see chapter 4.1.1.3 
Conclusion of first variable p. 16 and Table 1 of figures included therein.  
41 Björnehed, 2012:38 
42 Moderate Party, 2010; Swedish Social Democrats, 2010; Green Party, 2010, Centre Party, 2010 
43 Finns Party, 2010; Centre Party of Finland, 2006 
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4.1.1.1.1 The Moderate Party 
We initiate by analyzing the Moderate Party (107 mandates - 2010, 84 -2014). Their manifest, 
An active policy for immigrant’s establishment, was created slightly prior to the elections of 
2010. They describe Sweden as an open society that has been enriched culturally & 
economically by immigration and that Sweden should serve as a sanctuary for people that flee 
from persecution and oppression.44 They give the reader a picture (a prism) of Sweden as 
“open” and as a “sanctuary”, thus contributing to the national Swedish thematic frame.45 
Hence this perception becomes the reference point set by the politicians of the Moderate Party 
and become a benchmark for their course of action.46 In their present manifest they have 
chosen a more restrictive path which is manifested in the following quote: “Our new politics 
regarding migration and integration implies a third way between the Green Party´s wishes of a 
free immigration and the Sweden Democrat´s closed borders”47 [our translation]. They refer to 
the present situation as “unsustainable” and claims that Sweden must reduce the amount of 
RPDAS temporarily.48 In addition they request a change in the legislation enforcing the Dublin 
convention49 and temporary resident permits, which are both controversial propositions that 
express a totally new approach towards refugees.50 This sudden linguistic change in M from 
“open” & “enriched” to “unsustainable” is a typical example of a strategic change. The 
universal knowledge of how cognitive mechanisms influence party strategists to re-navigate 
strategy is, however, quite limited.51 Theoretically the move could be in line with Anthony 
Downs’s theory of vote maximization52 or it could be a way for the Moderate Party to, without 
organization gain in mind, handle what is perceived as a serious threat. What is certain, 
however, is that the radical alteration of the RP from a party holding a significant number of 
the parliamentary seats will affect both the thematic frame of Swedish immigration and the 
actual upcoming immigration situation. 
                                                 
44 Moderate Party, 2010 
45 Mintz & De Rouen, 2010:151–152; Guggenheimer, 2015:13-14; For a further discussion on the matter of the 
Swedish National thematic frame see chapter 4.1.1 The refugee policy (RP) of political parties in Sweden and 
Finland p. 10 
46 Mintz & De Rouen JR, 2010:150 
47 Moderate Party, 2015 
48 ibid 
49 The essence of the Dublin convention is that a refugee seeking asylum in Europe should be applying for this in 
the first country of arrival. He/she should therefore be denied the right to apply for asylum in any other country 
and being referred to the primary.  
50 Moderate Party, 2015 
51 Winther Nielsen, 2015:340 
52 Downs, 1957:135-141; Håkansson, 2010:69; The core of Down’s theory is that parties change strategies in 
order to fil a political vacuum i.e. a burning issue that few or no other parties pay attention to.  
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4.1.1.1.2 The Centre Party 
The Centre Party (23 mandates 2010, 22 – 2014) has a positive but lowly prioritized view of 
immigration in 2010 and solely states that: […] “Sweden should be an open and attractive 
country for immigrants”53 [our translation]. In 2015 migration politics is a core issue and the 
party states: “War and persecution forces millions to flee. Some come to Sweden. It is our 
duty to give them shelter, both as a state and as human beings”54 [our translation].  
Consequently C contributes to Swedish thematic migration frame55 by explicitly stating that 
Sweden should be open and more welcoming towards refugees.56 
 
4.1.1.1.3 The Social Democratic Party 
In The Swedish Social Democratic Party’s (112 mandates 2010, 113 – 2014) program from 
2010 they state that “Sweden is a clear example proving that the knowledge, labor and 
diversity that are caused by refugees have had significant importance for Swedish growth and 
development” [our translation].57 Regarding their RP they write; “We want Sweden and the 
EU to have a common, legally secure, humane, solidary and effective asylum policy” [our 
translation].58  They stick to their vision in their 2015-program which is being manifested as: 
“We Social democrats stand up for the right to seek asylum as a part of the human rights”59 
[our translation]. A slight difference from earlier writings is the increased emphasis of shared 
responsibility in the European Union: “In the EU the responsibility for refugees must be 
carried more solidary”60 [our translation]. One can also observe signs of the reaction to the 
refugee crisis: “To uphold the right of asylum, clear rules of conduct are required. In times of 
crisis this is even more vital”61 [our translation]. S mediates a very positive view using the 
typical “social democratic” words; humanitarian & solidary which could serve as both 
thematic and evaluative frames. An example of the thematic use is the connection to the party 
ideology and setting of environment where the RP is placed,62 which in the Social Democrat’s 
                                                 
53 Centre Party, 2010 
54 Centre Party, 2015 
55 Mintz & De Rouen  Jr, 2010:149; For a further discussion on the matter of the Swedish National thematic 
frame see chapter 4.1.1 The refugee policy (RP) of political parties in Sweden and Finland p. 10 
56 Centre Party, 2015 
57 Swedish Social Democratic Party, 2010 
58 ibid 
59 Swedish Social Democratic Party, 2015 
60 ibid 
61 ibid 
62 Entman, 2004:21-29 
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case is characterized by words such as “humane” and “welcoming” - thus contributing to the 
national Swedish thematic frame.63  
 
4.1.1.1.4 The Green Party 
The Green Party (25 mandates 2010 & 2014) states in their manifest from 2010 that the RP 
must have respect for human rights and declares that Sweden must create more legal ways to 
get into the country.64 In their 2015-program they call for a transformation towards more  
benevolent migration politics in Sweden and the establishment of “A world without borders 
where everyone has the right to move, but no one has to flee”.65 An ambitious writing indeed, 
which exceeds the already positive thematic Swedish migration frame.66  
 
4.1.1.1.5 The Sweden Democrats 
In their 2010-program The Sweden Democrats (20 mandates 2010, 49 – 2014) names a 
section A responsible immigration policy.67 The program states: “In today’s Sweden we have 
irresponsible immigration and integration politics. Our country has received too much 
immigrants in too little time, and only some of them have been refugees under UN´s Geneva 
convention. This has created broad economic, social, and cultural problems at the same time 
as we have decreased our space for supporting those people that really are suffering around 
the world.”68 [our translation]. SD is using threat framing by implying that immigrants by 
existence are threatening the Swedish society and its cultural values.69 For their 2015-program 
they chose the name A responsible RP70 and clarifies that they are not per se objecting 
immigration as a phenomenon, but objects the Swedish thematic migration frame for being 
too benign.71 The threat frame is less obvious in the later program but still expresses 
skepticism towards exceeding foreign influence.72   
 
 
                                                 
63 Swedish Social Democratic Party, 2015; Entman, 2004:21-29 
64 Green Party, 2010 
65 Green Party, 2015a; Green Party, 2015b 
66 For a further discussion on the matter of the Swedish National thematic frame see chapter 4.1.1 The refugee 
policy (RP) of political parties in Sweden and Finland p. 10 
67 Sweden Democrats 2010 
68 ibid 
69 Mintz & De Rouen Jr, 2010:150-152 
70 Sweden Democrats, 2015 
71 ibid 
72 ibid 
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4.1.1.2 Analysis of the refugee policies of the Finnish parties 
The five largest parties in Finland are Social Democratic Party of Finland (SDP), National 
Coalition Party (NCP), Centre Party Finland (CPF), Finns Party (Perus) and Left Alliance 
(LA).73  
 
4.1.1.2.1 The Social Democratic Party of Finland 
The RP of SDP (42 mandates 2011, 36 – 2015) is not displayed in their general manifests and 
one has to look into a separate, partially hidden, program from 2010 to encounter it.74 The 
program states that the eagerness to receive refugees and the management of refugees is 
connected to international solidarity and rooted into Finnish culture. In order to fulfil its 
responsibilities Finland needs to accelerate its management of asylum applications by 
expanding the Immigration Service.75 This line of thought is consistent in SDP’s 2015-
version, with the exception of a higher emphasis on EU-responsibility rather than a global 
ditto in the later version.76 Alike their Swedish social democratic counterparts SDP focuses on 
terms such as “solidarity” and “openness”, creating a thematic frame.77 SDP obviously tries to 
improve their own image in the matter by creating an evaluative frame where it equals itself 
to its Swedish system.78  
 
 
4.1.1.2.2 The National Coalition Party 
In 2010 the National Coalition Party (44 mandates 2011, 37-2015) only mentions immigration 
briefly and centers the discussion to labor immigration, thus excluding the asylum issue 
completely.79 In 2015 they adapt a more confronting perspective and wishes to empower “A 
child-friendly society and planned immigration policy”80 [our translation]. They explicitly 
states that: ”The Finnish RP should be humane but regulated”81 [our translation], which to a 
                                                 
73 Statistics Finland, 2015 
74 SDP, 2010 
75 ibid 
76 SDP, 2015 
77 Swedish Social Democrats, 2015; SDP, 2015; Mintz & De Rouen, 2010:150-152 
78 Swedish Migration Agency, 2015a; Finnish Immigration Service 2015a; Gross, 2008:171-174; Mintz & Redd, 
2003:195-198 
79 National Coalition Party, 2007:9-10 
80 National Coalition Party, 2015 
81 ibid  
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relatively high degree is a positive view of the phenomenon - incoherent with the Finnish 
national thematic frame of immigration.82 
 
4.1.1.2.3 The Centre Party of Finland 
The Centre Party’s (35 mandates 2011, 49 – 2015) program for 2010 is not mentioning RP at 
all.83 This indifference towards the immigration issue has altered, similarly to NCP, during the 
last decade resulting in an extensive RP-declaration in the Centre Party’s 2015-program.84 
The program problematizes the phenomenon of immigration, claiming it correlates with an 
increased crime rate and causes societal segregation.85 CPF believes that the only sustainable 
solution to the refugee problem is to restore peace in areas of crisis: “Refugees must be 
helped as close to their homes as possible86” [our translation]. CPF frames immigration as a 
passive threat towards the national security of Finland, claiming that the only actual solution 
to refugee crises is bilateral aid and disaster relief support. By this statement the Centre Party 
depicts immigration per se as malign for Finland, feeding the existent skeptical thematic 
frame currently residing in the country.87  
 
4.1.1.2.4 The Finns Party 
The Finns Party (39 mandates 2011, 38 - 2015) is the only Finnish party that explicitly state 
that RP is their major political issue.88 In 2010 their program is characterized by nationalistic 
strains with the refugee issue being linked to the famous quote “when in Rome, do as the 
Romans do”89 combined with rejection of a “burden sharing” regarding refugees.90 In their 
2015-program one of the most representative and conspicuous statements read: “Immigration 
creates an irreversible change in countries domestic population structures, it destroys the 
internal societal cohesion, it burdens the public services and the state’s economy to an 
unacceptable degree, leads to the growing of ghettos, favors religious radicalism and 
consequences originating from this and breeds ethnical conflicts”91 [our translation]. “The 
                                                 
82 Guggenheimer, 2015:14-15; For a further discussion on the matter of the Finnish National thematic frame see 
chapter 4.1.1 The refugee policy (RP) of political parties in Sweden and Finland p. 10 
83 The Centre Party Finland, 2006 
84 The Centre Party Finland, 2015 
85 ibid 
86 ibid 
87 Mintz & Redd, 2003:195-196; Entman, 2004:33–39  
88 Finn Party, 2010 
89 ibid 
90 ibid 
91 ibid 
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annual net immigration has during a decade increased to almost 20 000 without any political 
reaction. If the immigration continue at this rate, Finland will clearly have no possibility 
whatsoever to successfully integrate immigrants in the future whilst sustaining our social 
peace”92 [our translation]. This example of threat framing shows the Finns Party’s explicit 
picturing of refugees as a hostile element and claims that the consequences of exceeding 
immigration levels will be irreversible for the nation.93 The threat tactic becomes even more 
evident when one scrutinizes the 20 000 immigrants the Finn Party claim Finland receives 
annually. The total sum of residence permits distributed in 2014 was 17 995 but most of them 
were temporary permits for workers and students94 with only 1346 being approved asylum 
applications.95 The linkage of an annual residence permit distribution to asylum seekers of 
1346 with an impossible integration situation, is an evaluative frame serving the purpose of 
planting the idea of a much more overwhelming refugee situation to the Finnish people.96 
 
4.1.1.2.5 The Left Alliance 
The Left alliance (14 mandates 2011, 12 – 2015) has consistent manifest reaching from 2010 
– 2015 where they declare a desire for increased rights for immigrants and plans for improved 
societal integration.97 LA wishes to see Finland alter its joint national RP towards a more 
humane one characterized by a radically increased RPDAS.98 Except for some vague 
statements in the matter from the Social Democrats, LA is the only Finish party that explicitly 
requests a raised immigration level to Finland.99 They thereby substantially oppose the 
nation’s restrictive thematic immigration frame. They build their argument on using the word 
“humane” which is in line with their ideology and works as an own thematic frame for their 
RP.100 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
92 Finns Party, 2015 
93 Mintz & De Rouen Jr, 2010:151-152 
94 Finnish Immigration Service, 2015b  
95 Finnish Immigration Service, 2015a 
96 Mintz & Redd, 2003:195-198 
97 The Left Alliance, 2015 
98 ibid 
99 ibid 
100 Mintz & De Rouen Jr, 2010:150 
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4.1.1.3 Conclusion of the first variable 
 
To summarize the national thematic RP-frames are being upheld by several parties in both 
countries. The Swedish national frame, characterized by openness and the view of the 
phenomenon of immigration as enriching for the nation, has been maintained by the Social 
Democrats, the Moderate Party, the Centre Party and the Green Party until recently.101 This 
persistent support from a broad political spectrum in the question creates a foundational 
national support for the phenomenon as such, consequently creating a basis for extensive 
RPDAS. The smaller political parties in Sweden such as the Left Party, the Liberals and the 
Christian Democrats are generally contributing to the positive nation frame, with some 
contemporary statements from CD opposing the view.102 The recent policy change of the 
Moderate party along with increased support for the threat framing Sweden Democrats might 
alter this national frame. This will have implications for the upcoming immigration situation 
and the RPDAS. 
 
The Finnish restrictive national frame, additionally characterized by indifference towards 
the phenomenon, is mainly being upheld by the Finns Party and the Centre Party. Only the 
Left Alliance and the Social Democrats (to some degree) actively fight the battle for an 
alteration of the frame towards a Swedish model. With the smaller parties (the Green Party, 
Swedish People’s Party of Finland and Christian Democrats) sharing the indifference 
towards the question and two parties maintaining the negative view in governmental 
position,103 Finland is actively minimizing its RPDAS and will most likely continue this 
restrictive RP for a foreseeable future.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
101 The Moderate Party recently changed 
102 For additional information of the frames and stand-points of the smaller parties see Table 1 p. 17 
103 For a further discussion on the matter see the 4.1.1.2.3 The Centre Party Finland p. 15 and 4.1.1.2.4 The 
Finns Party p. 15 
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Party 
name 
Percentage of 
parliamentary 
seats  
2010/2015(1)104 
General 
view on 
immigration 
2010(2)105 
General 
view on 
immigration 
2015(2) 
Consistency 
2010-2015 
Type of 
framing(3)
106 
Immigration 
as 
possibility 
or 
threat(4)107 
Explicit 
focus on 
RP as 
subject(5)
108 
Social D. 32% Positive Positive Yes T Possibility Yes 
Moderate  27% Positive Negative No T, E, TH Possibility Yes 
Sweden D. 10% Negative Negative Yes TH Threat Yes 
Green P. 7% Positive Positive Yes T Possibility Yes 
Centre P. 6.4% Positive Positive Yes T Possibility Yes 
Liberals 6.1% Positive Positive Yes T Possibility Yes 
Left P. 5.7% Positive Positive Yes T Possibility Yes 
Christian  5.0% Positive Neutral No T Possibility Yes 
CPF 21% Neutral Negative No T, TH Threat Yes 
NCP 20.3% Neutral Positive Yes T Possibility No 
SDP 19% Positive Positive Yes T, E Possibility No 
Perus 18.8% Negative Negative Yes TH Threat Yes 
Left A. 6.5% Positive Positive Yes T Possibility Yes 
Green P. 6.3% Positive Positive Yes T Possibility No 
SFP 4.5% Positive Positive Yes T Possibility No 
CDF 2.8% Negative Negative Yes TH Threat Yes 
Table 1: Summary of mandate, frames and refugee polic(ies) of parties represented in the Swedish and Finnish parliament. 
 
State RPDAS 
in 2010 
RPDAS 
in 2011 
RPDAS 
in 2012 
RPDAS 
in 2013 
RPDAS 
in 2014 
RPDAS 
in 2015 
Total*  
Sweden 8732 9088 12 576 24 498 31 220 32 631 118 745 
Finland 1784 1271 1601 1827 1346 1532** 7534 
Difference 6948 7817 10 975 22 671 29 874 31 099 111 211 
Table 2: Display of the number of residence permits distributed to asylum seekers between 2010 – 2015 in Sweden and 
Finland. 
* All the data is collected from the official statistical archives of the Migration Boards. 
http://www.migrationsverket.se/English/About-the-Migration-Agency/Facts-and-statistics-/Statistics.html and 
http://www.migri.fi/about_us/statistics/statistics_on_asylum_and_refugees  
** The data from 2015 is only covering the first 11 months 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
104 1. The percentage of parliamentary seats for the last five years. Sum of parliamentary mandates in the last two 
elections, divided with the total amount of mandates of these elections.  
105 2. Interpretation of respective party´s general view on immigration and RP (Positive, Negative, Neutral). 
106 3. Distinguishing of each party’s evident frames (T), Evaluative (E) or Threat (TH). 
107 4. Interpretation of the party´s general views on immigration as possibility or threat. 
108 5. Analysis of whether the party give/how they give RP attention in their public writings. 
  19 
4.2 Analysis of second variable 
 
 
 
4.2.1 Examination of the levels of bureaucracy in the Swedish 
Migration Agency and the Finnish Immigration Service 
 
4.2.1.1 Prevalence of Weber’s first characteristic in the Migration Boards 
Weber’s first feature of bureaucracy is the narrowness of the employees’ mandate, which 
should be as limited as possible.109 The Swedish Migration Agency is divided into several 
departments,110 separated both hierarchically111 and geographically to a very high extent.112 
Furthermore the Swedish agency is conducted with the LEAN-philosophy113 with high 
emphasis on the importance of standardized tasks and tools for the employees,114 which 
greatly increases the efficiency of the procedure - but also reduces each employee’s 
mandate.115 The Finnish Immigration Service, on the other hand, is a more coherent 
organization with fewer employees and more diverse mandate.116 Their organizational 
structure has not been optimized and standardized like the Swedish case, thus creating a less 
regulated working environment in terms of mandates.117 
 
4.2.1.2 Prevalence of Weber’s second characteristic in the Migration Boards 
Weber’s second characteristic concerns the internal hierarchy of the organization and the 
leadership’s ability to conduct it in an external environment.118 In other words, can the 
Director General of the Migration Board maneuver the organization as he/she desire or will 
the organization and/or any other elements impede it? The Swedish Migration Agency has 
been a hierarchical organization for quite some time, but the authority of the leadership has 
expanded significantly during the last decade.119 In 2004 the Swedish Agency for Public 
Management analyzed the Migration Agency and criticized it for being too diversified, with 
a deficiency of power and responsibility connected to the Director General.120 It claimed that 
the geographic distribution of the regional offices could result in a divided organization if 
constant and evident connection to the executive leadership was not maintained. The SAPM 
                                                 
109 Weber, 2001:196–199; Dronberger, 1971:293–297 
110 For visual information on the Swedish Migration Agency see Appendix 1 p. 34 
111 For a further discussion on the hierarchy of the organizations see chapter 4.2.1.2 Prevalence of Weber’s 
second characteristic in the Migration Boards p. 19 
112 Swedish Migration Agency, 2016a; Swedish Migration Agency, 2016b 
113 Eliasson, 2011:16–17; The philosophy of LEAN is that efficiency and customer value are two symbiotic 
phenomenona. Accordingly a company or organization create tools to supply both. Practically speaking this is 
being implemented through standardization and the creation of routines, mandates and processes.  
114 Påhlsson, 2011:75 & 81-82  
115 Eliasson, 2011:25  
116 Swedish Migration Agency, 2015c; For visual information on the Finnish Immigration Board see Appendix 2 
p. 34 
117 The Finnish Immigration Service, 2013:2-7  
118 Mintzberg, 1983:9-15; Lachmann, 1971:62-67 
119 Swedish Migration Agency, 2015c 
120 The Swedish Agency of Public Management, 2004:21-22 
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therefore encouraged a more centralized authority and also recommended the development 
of a system visualizing the responsibility and mandates more noticeably.121 Two years later, 
when reforms were already initiated in order with SAPM’s recommendations, the Migration 
Agency received similar critique from the Swedish National Audit Office.122 The SNAO 
claimed that the leadership of the Migration Agency needed further insight into the 
organizations continuous work, thus encouraging it to supervise working papers and 
documents of its employees; not only when presented to the leadership but also occasionally 
during the working process.123 The essence of this critique was to homogenize the 
organizations task and make sure that every asylum seeker got treated equally, but in addition 
the review also increased the power of the leadership.124 Reforms originating from reports 
such as SAPM’s and SNAO’s have resulted in the Swedish Migration Agency today being 
very top-down in its character and indeed fulfils Weber’s second characteristic.125 The 
Finnish Migration Service lack the same geographic diversification and is more centralized 
to its headquarters. The responsibility for the organization is ultimately tied to the Director 
General, but the executive power is more divided. Whilst the Swedish Director General was 
encouraged to supervise the departments thoroughly the rest of the Finnish leadership are 
operating their departments more autonomously, thus creating a less hierarchical situation. 
 
4.2.1.3 Prevalence of Weber’s third characteristic in the Migration Boards 
The third Weberian characteristic is connected to the institutionalization of laws and 
organizational mandates for the Migration Agencies. That is, whether there are internal or 
external barriers for what the leadership may or may not do and what the organizations are 
entitled to accomplish. The Swedish Migration Agency has during the last decade almost 
monopolized the area of refugee management and also has the legal authority for this.126 The 
definitions of refugees and who should be granted asylum is of course regulated by laws,127 
but the operative work and the ultimate decisions are being taken almost solely by the 
Migration Agency.128 Until 2007 the question of integration was handled by the separated 
Integration Agency, which was merged into the Migration Agency thus uplifting the 
previous organizations core issues into the later.129 The Finnish Migration Service is 
regulated by laws to a higher degree than its Swedish counterpart.130 Finland also has a 
government department working solely with migration and asylum issues, whilst the 
Swedish counterpart (the Ministry of Justice) is working with all legal matters.131 The 
Finnish Migration Department is supreme to the Migration Service and have the authority to 
decide over core matters such as closure of asylum centers. The Finnish Migration Service 
consequently becomes a solely operative organ rather than a semi-political entity, such as 
                                                 
121 ibid 
122 Swedish National Audit Office, 2006:49-50 
123 ibid 
124 ibid 
125 Lachmann, 1971, s. 64-66 
126 Ministry of Justice Law on Foreigners chapter 4 §6,  chapter 5 §20 & chapter 8 §17 
127 ibid, chapter 1 §3, chapter 5 §1b-1c & chapter 13 §1 
128 Swedish Migration Agency, 2014:8-11  
129 Swedish Integraton Agency, 2007; Persson, 1997:98-103  
130 Law of the Immigration Agency, 1995  
131 Migration Department, 2016; Ministry of Justice, 2016  
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the Swedish counterpart, in addition to its operative activities.132 The Swedish Migration 
Agency is in legal terms inferior to the Ministry of Justice just like the Finnish equivalent is 
subordinated the Migration Department, but has been provided with significantly more 
resources and is autonomous to a completely different degree.  
 
4.2.1.4 Prevalence of Weber’s fourth characteristic in the Migration Boards 
Weber’s fourth criteria considers the specialization of the employees in terms of education 
and tasks. The more niched the employees are, the harder they are to transfer between 
positions and departments, hence creating a stable organization.133 Both the Swedish and 
Finnish Migration Boards fulfil this criteria to a relatively high degree by demanding a high 
level of education for their central positions.134 Intra-organizational rotation is of course 
taking place,135 but not to a degree that is considerably adventuring the Weberian criteria.136 
The difference between the Migration Boards is in this matter insignificant and does not alter 
the discrepancy substantially. 
 
4.2.1.5 Prevalence of Weber’s fifth characteristic in the Migration Boards 
The fifth characteristic concerns employees trying to implement external ideas into the 
organization and is partly connected to the fourth criteria. In order to maintain a stable 
organization the employees should not work for other organizations and/or companies whilst 
they are employed by the Migration Boards. The employees are not explicitly forbidden to 
so but most positions at the Boards are full time and few external consulting staff is involved, 
thus limiting external input significantly in both countries.137 
 
4.2.1.6 Prevalence of Weber’s sixth characteristic in the Migration Boards 
Weber’s last feature is the common vision of the bureaucracy that should be the core issue 
for all employees.138 Weber emphasizes the importance of creating a vision that the whole 
organization can contribute to, consequently motivation the bureaucracy to work as one.139 
The Swedish Migration Agency fulfills this criteria to its full extent by stating a clear vision: 
“The vision of Migration Agency ‘Sweden – a nation open for the possibilities of global 
migration.’”140 In order to manifest this goal the organization created a brochure stating its 
vision141 and how employees in different departments of the organization could contribute 
to this goal;142 mostly connected to the LEAN-philosophy with emphasis on teamwork, 
standardized processes and constantly keeping the mission in mind.143 The Finnish 
Migration Agency also has stipulated an organizational vision that reads: “From immigration 
                                                 
132 Law of the Immigration Agency, 1995; Swedish Migration Agency, 2015b 
133 Bendix, 1960:294–298 
134 Åberg 2011:155–160; Migrationsverket, 2016c 
135 Bäcklund, 2011:38–44;  
136 Weber, 2001:202 
137 Finnish Immigration Service, 2013:4-8; Swedish Migration Agency, 2016d 
138 Bendix, 1960:294-298 
139 Weiss, 1983:244-247; Bendix, 1960:289-293 
140 Swedish Migration Agency, 2016e  
141 Swedish Migration Agency, 2012:12–18 
142 Bäcklund, 2011:33–38 
143 Wallin, 2011:125–129; Påhlsson, 2011:77–82; Lidström, 2011:91–94 
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to citizenship – the leading specialist, partner and service provider.”144 The practical 
execution of this vision is, however, more diffuse and the mandates stipulated for the 
employees more vague.145  
 
 
 
4.2.2 Conclusion of first section of the second variable 
 
Summarizing the outcome of Weber’s six characteristics of bureaucracy it is evident that the 
Swedish Migration Board exceeds its Finnish counterpart significantly. Although some 
criteria (such as the fourth and the fifth) are both in line with the Weberian utopia, the 
Swedish agency with its LEAN-philosophy and less governmental regulation has a 
considerably wider mandate. The outcome of this discrepancy is that the Swedish agency 
resembles a vehicle conducted by the Director General to a much higher degree, than its 
Finnish counterpart. This phenomenon results in a situation where the Director General of 
the Swedish Migration Agency can affect the amount of RPDAS greatly if he/she desires, 
whilst the Finnish counterpart is pinioned and regulated by the Migration Department. The 
Finnish Director General could therefore not alter the amount of RPDAS prominently even 
if he/she desired. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
144 Finnish Immigration Service, 2016 
145 Finnish Immigration Service, 2013:5-8  
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4.2.3 Examination of the Director Generals at the 
Migration Boards between 2010 - 2015  
 
 
4.2.3.1 Jorma Vuorio 
Jorma Vuorio was Director General for the Finnish Immigration Service for about a 
decade, ending in the middle of 2013.146 He then became leader of the Migration 
Department, thus supervising and regulating Jaana Vuorio;147 his successor at the 
Migration Service.148 During his position at the Immigration Service Jorma Vuorio wished 
to see immigration as a regulated phenomenon and sought to keep the amount of RPDAS 
at a constant level; even during periods of international crisis.149 He favored the idea of 
citizenships being subject to empirical and linguistic knowledge of Finland & the Finnish 
language150 and openly expressed his concern with the Somali immigration.151 In sum he 
used his (quite limited) power as Director General to maintain the low level of RPDAS.152  
 
4.2.3.2 Jaana Vuorio 
His successor, Jaana Vuorio, was appointed in July 2013 and has also expresses a desire 
for strictly regulated migration.153 She initiated a two week asylum stop for Iraqi and 
Somali asylum seekers and exhorted an investigation of the security situation in these two 
states, in order to reduce the amount of RPDAS of these areas.154 Consequently Jaana, like 
her predecessor, uses her (quite limited) power to keep the level of RPDAS limited.155 
 
4.2.3.3 Dan Eliasson  
Dan Eliasson was Director General for the Swedish Migration Agency between May of 2007 
and September of 2011.156 His main contribution to the organization was the implementation 
of the LEAN-philosophy, which resulted in the achievement of a much higher efficiency in 
the handling of asylum applications,157 without jeopardizing the legal certainty of the asylum 
examinations.158 Eliasson expressed a benevolent view of immigration and is grateful over 
the fact that people want to come to Sweden.159 He has also stated that he felt the urge to 
vomit when watching Sweden Democrat leader Jimmie Åkesson debate.160 In contrast to the 
                                                 
146 Finnish Immigration Service, 2015c 
147 Although the similarity of the Director Generals names’ they are not related. 
148 Finnish Immigration Service, 2015c 
149 Backman, 2010 
150 Fredriksson, 2010 
151 Backman, 2010 
152 For further information about the number of RPDAS during the mandate of Joma Vuorio see Table 2 p.18 
153 Abdulkarim & Saarikoski, 2015 
154 von Kramer, 2015 
155 Savonius, 2015 
156 Eliasson, 2011:11–15 
157 ibid:18-23 
158 Ribbenvik, 2011:175-179 
159 Eliasson, 2011:24-29 
160 SVT, 2014; The incident ocurred when Eliasson was appointed Director General of the Social Insuranc 
Agency 
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Finnish Director Generals Eliasson undoubtedly increased the RPDAS through his benign 
view of immigration, the implementation of the LEAN-philosophy and the decision to grant 
permanent residence permits to Syrian refugees in 2013.161 
 
4.2.3.4 Anders Danielsson 
Anders Danielsson succeeded Eliasson in October 2013 and is the current Director General 
of the agency. Danielsson has compared to his Finnish counterparts an incredibly wide 
mandate, but he wishes to extend it further: “I should have an extremely wide freedom of 
action. One could equate it with an American admiral on a carrier. A whole armada of ships. 
He just stands there: pointing out the target, navigates, decides the velocity”162 [our 
translation]. When asked what he would do if the Sweden Democrats would achieve 
governmental position and implement their immigration politics he answered: “Then I 
would have to leave. I am not going to point out a specific party but if we theoretically would 
receive immigration politics that is incompatible with my values, I only have one choice and 
that is to quit my job”163 [our translation]. Danielsson is also distancing himself from the 
idea of proclaiming “safe countries” in the way Jaana Vuorio tried to declare Somalia and 
Iraq.164 In sum Danielsson is extensively affecting the amount of RPDAS through his broad 
(and potentially widening) mandate as Director General and his very positive view of the 
effects of immigration and cultural diversity.165  
 
 
4.2.4 Conclusion of the second variable 
The discrepancy between the Swedish and Finnish Director Generals is remarkable. Both 
Jorma Vuorio and Jaana Vuorio are reactionary leaders striving for a strictly regulated 
RPDAS. The Swedish Migration Agency, on the other hand, emphasizes the positive effects 
of immigration at a societal level and wishes to maintain (if not increase) the already high 
Swedish figure. Jorma Vuorio and Jaana Vuorio have quite limited power to affect the actual 
numbers in any direction,166 but evidently tries to reduce the RPDAS additionally. Dan 
Eliasson and Anders Danielsson have both explicitly stated that their beliefs and modus 
operandi is incongruent with restriction policies and party’s waging such values.167 They are 
both to be classified as benign to RPDAS and, with the assistance of the extremely 
bureaucratic168 Migration Agency, they are almost to be considered sovereign rulers of the 
organization. Accordingly, the high number of RPDAS is without doubt related to Dan 
Eliasson’s and Anders Danielsson’s view of high immigration as a beneficial phenomenon 
for the Swedish society. 
                                                 
161 Eliasson, 2011:12-17; Swedish Migration Agency, 2015b 
162 af Kleen, 2015 
163 ibid 
164 Abdulkarim & Saarikoski, 2015; af Kleen, 2015 
165 ibid 
166 For a further discussion on the Finnish Director General’s power see chapter 4.2.2 Conclusion of first section 
of the second variable p. 22 
167 af Kleen, 2015; SVT, 2014 
168 Weber, 2001:196-199; The term bureaucratic in Weber’s eyes is, as a reminder, almost synonymous with the 
term effective. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
As declared in the variable’s sub-conclusions there is a correlation between each variable 
and the amount of RPDAS. We still claim that the variables are contributing jointly to the 
Swedish-Finnish asylum-discrepancy, in the sense that the first variable is directly affecting 
the second by creating boundaries for the freedom of action of the Migration Boards. To 
clarify this statement we assert that the national thematic frames created by the leading 
political parties establish a framework for the respective Migration Board, limiting its width 
of possible actions. The efficiency of the Migration Boards is ultimately depending on their 
level of bureaucracy, according to Weber’s theory of the phenomenon. A completely 
developed bureaucracy is also fully conductible by the organizations leadership, in this case 
the Director General. Ultimately it is therefore the intention and conviction of the Director 
General that will decide the course of action of an ideal bureaucracy.  
The Swedish Migration Agency is to be considered such a bureaucracy. With both the 
current and previous Director General being positive towards high levels of immigration, 
the outcome of their terms of office is a large number of RPDAS. The Finnish Immigration 
Service lacks most of the bureaucratic characteristics inherited by its Swedish counterpart, 
thus making it less conductible by its Director General. In addition both the current and 
previous Director General of this organization are reactionary and wishes to see strictly 
regulated RPDAS. Even if the Finnish Director General would like to increase Finland’s 
RPDAS, the ineffectiveness of the Finnish Immigration Service would halt the procedure 
significantly. In addition the national Finnish thematic frame contributes to this restriction 
since the majority of the political parties are being indifferent towards immigration as a 
phenomenon. Out of the parties that, however, places strong emphasis on the issue most 
expresses a desire for strict regulations of RPDAS; sometimes even projecting immigration 
as a threat. In Sweden the immigration issue is frequently debated with most parties having 
a benign image of the phenomenon. Consequently a reversed scenario is taking place there, 
with the Swedish Migration Agency receiving an extremely wide mandate in terms of 
RPDAS.  
With the reasoning above in mind, we conclude that the characteristics of the national 
thematic frame towards immigration - along with the level of bureaucracy - and the mindset 
of the Director General jointly affects the amount of distributed residence permits to 
asylum seekers significantly.  
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5.1 Concluding remarks 
 
The conclusion above claims that there is a clear correlation between our independent 
variables and the distribution of residence permits to asylum seekers. By proving such a 
correlation analyzing the two overall similar states Sweden and Finland, we believe that our 
results are applicable to other cases as well. Our contribution to the field could therefore be 
summarized as: If a state has been characterized by a positive national thematic frame 
towards immigration for at least five consecutive years and currently has a bureaucratic 
Migration Board with an immigration-benevolent Director General, it will distribute a 
large number of residence permits to asylum seekers. If a completely reversed scenario 
exists, the state will distribute an extremely low number of residence permits to asylum 
seekers. If a state is characterized by a positive thematic frame towards the phenomenon, 
but has a non-efficient Migration Board and/or a Director General opposing immigration to 
some degree, the state will distribute an average number of residence permits to asylum 
seekers. 
What one should bear in mind is that the study is limited to explaining this phenomenon, 
not to establish a thorough understanding of, for instance, how national thematic frames 
towards immigration are created in detail. One should also take notice that this thesis fully 
excludes the normative dimension of the question.  
A normative analysis of the issue and/or a study creating a deeper understanding of the 
underlying mechanisms of our independent variables are our recommendations for further 
research to anyone who wishes to, in the name of cumulatively, expand this relatively 
uncharted research field.   
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